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As recently as a decade ago, primary equity markets in continental Europe provided investors 
with low levels of transparency and corporate governance standards (La Porta et al. 1997). 
This contrasts sharply with common law jurisdictions, where investors have long enjoyed 
significantly higher levels of investor protection. Certainly, continental European countries 
have  law  regimes  that differ  from Anglo  American jurisdictions, particularly  in terms of 
disclosure.  New  comparative  research  on  securities  markets  has  shown  that  some  legal 
systems give investors more protection against fraud and expropriation than others and has 
suggested  that  the  control  of  information  asymmetry  is  an  essential  precondition  for  the 
establishment of a strong capital market. As a minimum, increasing the level and scope of 
disclosure is likely to be significant. Higher quality disclosure, which gives the investors a 
higher level of protection, increases the accuracy of asset pricing, which is likely to have an 
impact on investor confidence (Fox 2000).   
The corporate governance regimes of most continental European countries place emphasis on 
rules  and  regulations  protecting  stakeholders,  such  as  creditors  and  employees,  in  sharp 
contrast with the common law countries’ reliance on judicially-enforced legal rules to protect 
investors. At a first  glance,  the  weakness  of the rules protecting minority investors from 
asymmetric information and opportunism makes it harder for capital markets in continental 
Europe to raise the external funds to support a higher rate of initial public offerings (IPOs) for 
high-growth,  start-up  businesses.  Given  the  limits  on  the  ability  of  firms  to  raise  funds, 
reform-minded policymakers possess a number of alternatives that can generate rapid changes 
tailored to meet the regulatory needs of issuers and investors.  
Previous  research  has  shown  that  one  way  to  increase  investor  protection  in  continental 
Europe would be for individual country regulators to generate a range of investor protections 
within  the  context  of  a  mandatory  disclosure  regime  and  supply  a  more  effective  set  of 
enforcement mechanisms (Bratton and McCahery 2001). Even though it would be important 
to  improve  the  disclosure  requirements  in  company  law  and  provide  more  effective 
enforcement mechanisms to protect investors and creditors at the national level, it is quite 
obvious that such a distinctive shift in the legal system is a lengthy process. Despite the 
efficiency benefits that greater investor protection would bring to equity markets, regulators 
will not, because they lack sufficient incentives, commit themselves to revise regulations that 




regulators  have  the  incentives  and  resources  to  devise  harmonized  legal  protections  that 
benefit  investors,  the  revisions  will  not  necessarily  make  expropriation  more  difficult 
(Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Hopt 2002).  
Harmonization  of  corporate  law  in  the  EU,  of  course,  is  not  the  only  way  that  investor 
protection can be improved. Given the practical difficulties of enhancing transparency and 
disclosure practices, corporate  governance deficiencies  may  be addressed alternatively by 
establishing ex ante stock markets that guarantee better levels of shareholder protection and 
high levels of disclosure (Pagano 1998).  Indeed, this is precisely the route taken by Europe’s 
‘new stock markets’, i.e. the Nieuwe Markt in Amsterdam, Euro.NM Brussels, the Neuer 
Markt in Frankfurt, the Nuovo Mercato in Milan, and the Nouveau Marché in Paris, the latter 
being the first of the European New Markets (Euro.NMs). Although this is not a solution for 
the official markets, which are obliged to comply with the mandatory terms of the EU issuer 
disclosure  regime  (Moloney  2002),  the  Euro.NMs  alliance  imposed  additional  restrictive 
disclosure  measures  on  new  issuers  in  order  to  promote  investor  protection  and  investor 
confidence.  
Triggered to a large extent by the impressive emergence of high-tech businesses in the US, 
the Euro.NMs sought to emulate the Nasdaq, a highly liquid exchange that has high disclosure 
and  transparency  standards  (Röell  1998).  Thus,  as  with  the  Nasdaq,  the  combination  of 
stricter  disclosure  rules  and  less  stringent  entry  requirements  (regarding  age,  size,  and 
minimum  profitability  requirements)  than  companies  face  on  first-tier  markets  led  to  the 
development  of  a  very  active  initial  public  offering  market  in  Europe.  In  Germany,  for 
example, the Neuer Markt, which created the most stringent disclosure regime, accounted for 
the largest share of capital raised in IPOs compared to Europe’s other new markets (Bottazzi 
and Da Rin 2002). It is noteworthy, however, that not all new market segments have pursued 
a high disclosure listings strategy (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). An alternative, embraced 
by the United Kingdom, is to eliminate exchange-based listings rules and transfer authority to 
the stock exchange regulator, which establishes the minimum rules governing admissions 
(Macey and O’Hara 2002). For example, this regulatory arrangement gives the London Stock 
Exchange some discretion over which applicants, subject to their satisfying the minimum 
requirements, are admitted to trade on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). As can be 




In  general,  despite  the  higher  transaction  costs  generated  by  the  higher  disclosure  and 
reporting requirements of the new markets, there is ample evidence that issuing firms benefit 
from  higher  disclosure  standards  in  the  form  of  lower  costs  of  capital  (Romano  2001). 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that some firms floating on the Euro.NMs in the late 1990s 
were able to diversify their shareholdings rapidly after setting up their company (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist 2001). Diversification is particularly important since the models developed by 
Kahn and Winton (1996) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) predict that firms with high-
growth rates and volatile cash flows will go public early in their life cycle and thus allow the 
founders to diversify their investments.  
This chapter focuses on the initial offerings in the European New Markets which are largely 
under-researched markets. We study the short-run and long-run performance of Euro.NM 
IPOs. Ex ante it is difficult to formulate a hypothesis about whether or not initial underpricing 
in the Euro.NMs is higher or lower than underpricing in the regular markets. On the one hand, 
stronger  disclosure  requirements  on  the  Euro.NMs  reduce  the  degree  of  asymmetric 
information between insider and outsider shareholders such that credible offer prices are more 
likely to be set and underpricing tends to be lower than on the regular markets. On the other 
hand, the entry requirements are less stringent for the Euro.NMs than for the regular markets 
where some of the smaller firms and those with short trading histories would not be admitted. 
This implies that more uncertainty about the correct offer price (maybe resulting in more 
severe underpricing) is to be expected for the Euro.NMs. Which of the two effects applies is 
an  empirical matter which  we investigate in  this chapter. We document  that the average 
underpricing  measured on the first  day ranges from  as low as 4  per cent in France to a 
staggering 86 per cent in the Netherlands. We argue that the large differences in underpricing 
across the Euro.NMs can be explained in terms of differences in industry distributions. Our 
results confirm the findings that sectors with a high degree of information asymmetry will be 
significantly underpriced (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm 2001). We also examine the 
long-run performance of IPOs on the Euro.NMs over the period of 1996-2000. Whether or not 
the long-term price correction for the Euro.NMs is stronger or weaker than that for the regular 
markets may depend on the degree of initial price reaction (underpricing). We also investigate 
the effect of the bursting of the ‘internet bubble’ in 2000. Although, there are numerous 
studies on the long-run performance of IPOs on Europe’s main equity markets, this is the first 




This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the history and performance of the 
Euro.NMs. Section 3 analyses the listing and disclosure standards of these markets. In our 
discussion, we emphasize that the few discernable differences between the set of listing and 
disclosure requirements among the new markets are unlikely to serve as the basis for an 
institutional explanation for the higher underpricing during the bull market of 1996-2000. In 
section 4, we provide data on the short-run underpricing and consider alternative theories for 
the  high  short-run  underpricing  on  the  Euro.NMs.  We  also  document  the  long-run 
underperformance  of  the  Euro.NM  IPOs  and  discuss  a  number  of  explanations  for  this 
phenomenon. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Rise and fall of the European New Markets  
Sub-section  2.1  focuses  on  the  competition  between  stock  exchanges  that  has  led  to  the 
increasing irrelevance of national boundaries. Increased competition has led to the creation of 
new market segments which have new listing and disclosure rules that facilitate the capital 
raising  process  for  high-growth,  start-up  companies.  In  sub-section  2.2,  we  describe  the 
creation  of  the  European  New  Markets  in  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the 
Netherlands. We discuss the common regulatory features of the alliance of European New 
Markets, showing that the adoption of lower entry requirements and more stringent disclosure 
rules played an important step in the development of these exchanges. We argue that there are 
a number of reasons why the listing and disclosure rules played little or no role for the high 
underpricing of IPOs on the Euro.NMs.  
 
2.1 Competition between exchanges 
In the past, exchanges were natural monopolies and there was little competition for listings 
(Mahoney 1997). Within this framework, the relationship between stock exchanges and firms 
applying  for  a  listing  was  viewed  as  giving  rise  to  a  long-term  contract  in  which  stock 
exchanges supplied liquidity, corporate governance rules, clearing and monitoring services 
and a signalling function to investors in exchange for listing fees (Macey and O’Hara 1999). 
However, the globalisation of securities markets has recently led to a growing number of 
companies  seeking  to  raise  capital  across  borders  and  financial  markets  becoming  more 




are a direct result of technological innovation, elimination of cross-border capital controls, 
and the introduction of new trading systems. An immediate consequence of the changes that 
have taken place is the diminished role of exchanges as the dominant supplier of high quality 
corporate governance rules, and monitoring, signalling and clearance services.  It is important 
to  underline the obvious fact  that because there are alternatives  to products and services 
supplied  by  exchanges,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  exchanges  will  face  increasing 
competition from automated trading systems, where it is possible to trade securities generally 
listed on exchanges (Steil 1996; DiNoia 1998).   
While in the US there has been strong competition between equity markets for a long time, 
competition among exchanges in much of continental Europe goes back to the mid-to-late 
1980s  only  (Macey  2001).  Some  have  noted  that  the  competition  between  European 
exchanges has led to significant reductions in trading fees – which have benefited investors – 
and a proliferation of trading mechanisms which increase market liquidity (Pagano 1998). In 
the context of competitive capital markets, exchanges present issuers with a choice of listing 
requirements, trading systems, and trading and listing fees (Santos and Scheinkman 2000). 
These  are  offered  by profit-maximizing exchanges in order  to maintain their  competitive 
advantage (Biasis and Faugeron-Crouzet 2002; Foucault and Parlour 1999). 
Unfortunately,  there  are  significant  differences  in  the  level  and  quality  of  competition 
between the main and secondary markets in Europe. For the most part, the effective absence 
of competition within countries between first and second-tier exchanges was a primary cause 
(along with inadequate investor demand) of the undercapitalised state of European small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Röell 1998). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the 
focus of Europe’s first-tier exchanges on large, blue-chip firms reduced the attractiveness of 
the second-tier exchanges, which made it difficult for these exchanges to attract listings from 
firms that would be eligible to list on a first-tier exchange. Naturally, the most obvious way 
for the second-tier markets to compete with the rival first-tier exchanges was to become an 
independent  exchange,  like  Nasdaq,  which  could  provide  a  home  for  high-tech  firms  in 
Europe that would normally apply for a US listing. To a large extent, the emergence of the 
Euro.NMs, along with Nasdaq Europe (Easdaq) and AIM is best seen as an attempt to pursue 
such a strategy. 





In 1996/97, the European New Markets were launched in order to facilitate the financing of 
innovative companies with a high-growth potential, which were the type of companies that 
continental  European  listing  rules  would  have  excluded  earlier.  The  Euro.NMs  were 
developed to provide European equity issuers with an alternative to the – at the time – shining 
example  of  Nasdaq.  Consequently,  the  Euro.NMs  established  admissions,  listings  and 
disclosure regulation, trading procedures and operational standards as a means to achieve an 
efficient decentralized market which reduced the barriers to flotation for small and medium-
sized companies and provided start-up ventures with the best possible access to risk capital 
(Avgerinos 2000). The Euro.NMs also adopted a dual trading system consisting of a mix of a 
quote-driven  and  order-driven  system,  to  ensure  adequate  market  liquidity.  By  creating 
greater liquidity for the shares of SMEs and setting high listing and disclosure standards, the 
New Markets also aimed at attracting institutional investors.  
The  French  New  Market  (Nouveau  Marché)  was  the  first  to  be created and commenced 
operating on 14 February 1996 as an alternative, independent investment market governed by 
its own organizational and operating rules while trading and clearing is done by SBF-Paris 
(Société des Bourses Françaises). At the end of 2001, the total market capitalization of the 
164 companies listed on the Nouveau Marché was ¼ELOOLRQ2QO\SHU cent of these firms 
came  from  foreign  jurisdictions.  Table  1  shows  the  growth  in  the  IPO  activity  on  the 
Euro.NMs from the start until 2000. The table reports only true IPOs and hence excludes (i) 
transfers from the OTC, (ii) firms already listed on Easdaq, (iii) introductions (admissions to 
the listing without any sale of shares), (iv) rights issues, and (v) firms with missing share 
prices. However, the table includes foreign listings
1 and dual listings with Nasdaq and other 
non-European markets. In its first two years of trading, the Nouveau Marché attracted 14 and 
17 IPOs, respectively. IPO activity picked up in 1998 when 39 firms applied for a listing and 
the trend continued until 2000 when 50 firms were granted a listing. Venture capital activity, 
moreover, increased during the 1990s as a result of the opening of the Nouveau Marché.  
[insert table 1 here] 
As a consequence of the increasing demand for equity investment in Germany, the Deutsche 
Börse established the Neuer Markt on 10 March 1997 to meet the financing needs of young 
                                                 




companies  which  were  not  catered  for  by  the  existing  markets,  i.e.  the  Official  Market 
(Amtlicher Markt) and the Regulated Market (Geregelter Markt). The Neuer Markt is legally 
part of the Regulated Market, which was created in 1986. However, technically, the Neuer 
Markt is not a market organised by public authorities, but is privately organised and benefits 
therefore from a greater flexibility in terms of tailoring its regulation to improve investor 
protection. This approach yielded positive results as the Neuer Markt soon proved successful 
in attracting new issues (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). The number of firms seeking a 
Neuer Markt listing took off with 11 flotations and rose spectacularly to 143 in 2000. By the 
end of 2000 (see table 1), 325 companies were listed and the market capitalization was in 
excess of ¼ELOOLRQ%HFNHUDQG+HOOPDQQKDYHGRFXPHQWHGKRZWKHNeuer Markt 
undoubtedly contributed to the deepening of the venture capital market, which has matured in 
recent years.  
On 25 March 1997,  the  Amsterdam  Exchanges created a new  market segment (the New 
Market  of  Amsterdam  Exchanges  (NMAX)),  which  developed  its  own  rules  for  listing 
eligibility.  This  initiative  was  soon  followed  by  the  Brussels  Exchange,  which  created 
Euro.NM Brussels on 11 April 1997. In comparison to their French and German counterparts, 
the Euro.NMs of Amsterdam and Brussels have only known a modest success. The total 
number of IPOs on the Dutch and Belgium markets was 16 and 14, respectively. Also, by 
contrast  with  the  Nouveau  Marché  and  Neuer  Markt,  the  firms  listed  on  the  Dutch  and 
Belgium new markets had little if any venture capital support. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) 
suggest that the absence of venture capital-supported IPOs in the Dutch market is explained 
by the long recognized tradition of Dutch firms listing on the Nasdaq.  
The youngest Euro.NM is the Milanese Nuovo Mercato that was created by Opengate SpA, an 
Italian IT services group on 17 June 1999 and is operated by Borsa Italiana. Whilst the Nuovo 
Mercato has only 27 listed companies, it includes Tiscali, one of Europe’s largest internet 
service provider in 2000.  
It is worth pointing out that Easdaq, which was established in June 1996 to provide a market 
for a broad range of high-tech growth companies, was unable to compete successfully in 
terms of size, liquidity and performance against the Euro.NMs and was taken over by Nasdaq 




Market (AIM) created in June 1995, and the techMark
2 started in November 1999) have been 
unable to match the performance of the Euro.NMs.  
Indeed, the early success of the Euro.NMs has been remarkable: at the end of May 2000, 438 
companies from 13 countries were listed across all the Euro.NMs, the total amount of new 
capital raised exceeded  ¼ELOOLRQDQGWKHWRWDOPDUNHWFDSLWDOL]DWLRQZDVDURXQG¼
billion. Of the 438 firms, 27 were dually listed on Nasdaq and on 7 other markets. The market 
performance has also been very impressive with the official Euro.NM All-share Index rising 
by 561 per cent since the start of 1998 until March 2000 (Grant Thornton 2002), just prior to 
the market crash.  
At the end of March 2000, the Belgian, Dutch and French Euro.NMs announced that they 
were merging to form EuroNext. The inability to harmonize five sets of listing rules, the 
involvement of five different national regulators and inefficient cross-border trading led to the 
breakup of the Euro.NMs in December 2000. Consequently, the five Euro.NMs were reduced 
to three: the German Neuer Markt, the Italian Nuovo Mercato and EuroNext.
3  
Since the dissolution of the Euro.NMs, the new markets have suffered particularly badly from 
the decline in technology stocks with losses on some markets exceeding 80 per cent. In 2001, 
there were virtually no new issues with fewer than 20 IPOs down from more than 200 in 
2000. In 2001, the Nuovo Mercato had a liquidity of 11 per cent (measured by turnover of 
shares as a percentage of total market capitalization), Neuer Markt 6 per cent, the Nouveau 
Marché 4 per cent, AIM 3 per cent, and Nasdaq Europe 1 per cent (Grant Thornton 2002). 
Clearly the growth rate of the New Markets has slowed down.  Unsurprisingly, Deutsche 
Börse AG announced on 27 September 2002 that the Neuer Markt, which has seen its market 
capitalization decline by more than 95 per cent of its value in the last 2.5 years and has 
suffered from a series of insider trading and manipulation scandals
4, would be closed for 
trading in 2003. The Independent Newspaper quoted on 27 September 2002 Alastair Duffy 
(Aegon Asset Management) saying that ‘high-growth companies that needed a lot of finance 
would look for a listing on Neuer Markt – it was a high-profile index. But companies listed on 
                                                 
2 TechMark is not an independent exchange but is a segment of the Official List of the London Stock Exchange. 
3 At the beginning of 2002, the Borsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto merged with EuroNext. Furthermore, the 
Bourse de Luxembourg has an agreement about cross membership and cross access with EuroNext. 
4 For example, the top executives of EM.TV & Merchandising face trial on charges that they manipulated the 
share price (New York Times 27/9/2002). The boss of Comroad, Bodo Schnable, was also charged with share 
manipulation as almost all the sales reported in the firm’s 2001 annual report were fictitious (Financial Times 




it have had issues with fraud, directors being jailed, and some of the business models have 
been very suspect. It became the last place you would want to list a business because of the 
negative associations.’ One of the problems of the Neuer Markt was that the regulator could 
not enforce shareholders to comply with the mandatory lock-in period. Still, lock-in periods 
were considered as important mechanisms to reduce asymmetric information between old and 
new shareholders: forcing the incumbents to keep their holdings over a certain time after the 
IPO makes it more likely that any private information becomes public (Brav and Gompers 
2000). The need for compulsory lock-ins is particularly important for firms subject to higher 
asymmetric information such as the young and high-tech firms of the Euro.NMs. 
The decision to discontinue the Neuer Markt is part of a wide shake-up of the way German 
companies  are  listed.  Companies  will  have  to  comply  with  a  set  of  vigorous  reporting 
standards. Technology stocks will be brought to the main exchange, where companies will be 
listed  on  different  segments  according  to  their  size.  A  segment  for  small  to  mid-cap 
companies will sit underneath the blue chip constituents of the DAX.  
Probably, further consolidation is inevitable given the failure of the New Markets to attract 
foreign companies.
5 There can be little doubt that consolidation will most likely be a natural 
consequence of the introduction of the European Commission’s new disclosure regime, which 
is designed to transform the Listing Particulars Directive and Public Offers Directive. The 
new regime is based on the introduction of enhanced, uniform disclosure standards for public 
offers of securities, the introduction of a shelf-registration document, and the adoption of a 
multilateral admissions system. Ultimately, even though the new proposed disclosure regime 
is  designed  to  benefit  companies  that  raise  capital  on  Europe’s  national  exchanges,  the 
evidence  suggests  that  the  proposed  removal  of  the  distinction  between  the  official  and 
second-tier markets and the requirement for the approval of prospectuses will have a costly 
impact on small and medium-sized firms and the performance of the new markets (Moloney 
2002). 
 
                                                 
5 Nasdaq Europe suffers even more from low liquidity. Innogenetics (listed on Nasdaq Europe) claimed that its 
share price suffered from the low liquidity of Nasdaq Europe and applied for a listing on EuroNext Brussels. The 
announcement of the listing triggered a positive announcement reaction of 19.2% which can be attributed to the 
higher liquidity provided by that market. An earlier transfer (for liquidity reasons) by Melexis from Nasdaq 




3. Listing and Disclosure Requirements 
In this section, we briefly discuss the economics of listing rules and then describe the main 
features of the listing and disclosure requirements for the European New Markets. As noted 
earlier, one of the main reasons for the success of the Euro.NMs in developing a more active 
IPO market is the enhanced listing and disclosure requirements imposed on issuer firms (see 
table  2).  Although,  in  this  section,  we  find  some  differences  in  regulation  between  the 
markets, we argue that these differences are minor and cannot be the main reason for the 
substantial differences in the short-run and long-run performance of IPOs. 
From the outset, it is important to note that exchanges provide an important service consisting 
of a screening of the information provided by the firm applying for a listing. The quality of 
this information is important, as analysts and investors will use it to evaluate the performance 
and  prospects  of  the  firm.  In  establishing  listing  requirements,  stock  exchanges  aim  to 
safeguard the interests of investors by requiring the disclosure of sufficient information about 
the applicant for a listing. Typically, exchanges will establish minimum quantitative standards 
–  minimum  number  of  shares  outstanding,  average  trading  volume,  market  value  of 
outstanding  shares,  and  public  shares  outstanding  –  financial  criteria,  and  disclosure 
requirements. It is generally acknowledged, however, that stock exchanges do not, for many 
reasons, provide a financial assessment of the filings of the applicant firms. Even though 
stock exchanges will only evaluate applicant firms on a going concern basis, the issuer’s 
choice of exchange, nevertheless, will signal important information to investors about the 
firm. In this analysis, it is assumed that the branding of listing rules will have a direct effect 
on the level of competition between exchanges for listings (Macey and O’Hara 2002). The 
proliferation of exchanges will offer firms applying for a listing a greater variety of choice of 
listing rules (Santos and Scheinkman 2000; Foucault and Parlour 2001). The most direct 
effect of the competition of exchanges in the design of listing rules is that high-disclosure 
exchanges  will  attract  more  firms  than  low-disclosure  exchanges  (Huddart,  Hughes  and 
Brunnermeir 1999). This argument rests on the assumption that liquidity traders will choose 
to trade in firms listed on high-disclosure exchanges. In turn, corporate insiders, who control 
the listing decision, will follow the flow of liquidity to the exchanges where the trading costs 
are lowest. In a closely related paper, Boot and Thakor (2001) show that, since high-quality 
firms will benefit from a better disclosure of certain types of information, exchanges will have 




quality listing firms. There is another argument in favour of improved disclosure standards: 
the benefit of higher standards for issuing firms is that the listing reduces the firms’ cost of 
capital (Fox 2001). 
Despite the ongoing competition between the Euro.NMs and the other second-tier exchanges 
(e.g.  Nasdaq  Europe  and,  AIM  and  the  techMark),  there  has  recently  been  substantial 
convergence in terms of new listing regulations. The rules, among other things, require the 
filing  of  quarterly  reports,  the  provision  of  continually  updated  information,  and  the 
submission of financial statements that must be reported in US GAAP, IAS or a national 
version  of  GAAP.  Detailed  economic  research  of  firms  listed  on  the  Neuer  Markt  has 
revealed that the differences in the bid-ask spread and share turnover across IAS and US 
GAAP are statistically insignificant (Leuz 2002). The implication is that US GAAP and IAS 
are equivalent in terms of quality. Interestingly, nearly every new market in Europe allows 
listed firms to adopt either IAS or GAAP. From the perspective of an issuer, the Euro.NMs’ 
admission and listing obligations are rigorous and quite extensive. For example, the rules are 
also  reasonably  stringent  with  respect  to  lock-in  periods,  the  issuing  prospectus,  and 
disclosure of transactions by managers. Yet, in other respects, the admissions rules are not 
very stringent: the issuer size requirements, minimum proceeds and trading history rule allow 
young, small firms (like e.g. innovative high-growth companies) to seek a listing. 
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the listing and disclosure criteria for the two 
largest exchanges in the Euro.NMs alliance, the Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché. We noted 
earlier  that  the  Euro.NMs  have  substantially  converged  in  terms  of  their  disclosure  and 
transparency requirements and operational standards so as to make their markets attractive to 
investors. In particular, the enhanced level of transparency that the Neuer Markt and Nouveau 
Marché demand of issuing firms can be seen as an advantage, particularly if listing firms 
expect to attract the support of institutional investors.  
Table 2 states the criteria that issuers must satisfy in order to list on the Neuer Markt and 
Nouveau Marché. In terms of prerequisites for admission, the rules on the two markets are 
very  similar.  First,  the  issuer  must  have  at  least  ¼ P RI HTXLW\ FDSLWDO 6HFRQG WKH
minimum  number  of  shares  issued  must  be  at  least  100,000  and  the  minimum  market 
capitalization must be at least ¼P7KLUGWKHUHPXVWEH a minimum free float of 20 per cent. 
Firms are required to have a market maker to provide liquidity support. Fourth, at least half of 




equity. In contrast to the Neuer Markt which has a six-month lock-in period for all shares, the 
Nouveau Marché subjects insiders to a lock-in of 80 per cent of their shares for a period of 12 
months or 100 per cent of their shares for 6 months. The listing prospectus of firms applying 
to  either  market  has  to  contain  information  about:  (1)  the  issuer,  its  share  capital,  and 
business; (2) the assets, financial position, and profits and loss statements; (3) associated 
companies and affiliates of the issuer; (4) board(s) of directors; and (5) recent developments, 
business  prospects  and  risk  factors.  In  terms  of  continuing  obligations  for  issuers,  both 
markets have established strict disclosure regimes.
6 
[insert table 2 here] 
The early success of the Neuer Markt and Nouveau Marché depended on several factors. One 
of the most important factors is the stringent disclosure regime aimed at protecting minority 
investors. The listing rules for both exchanges are more extensive than those applicable to 
listed securities on the Official Exchanges. There is evidence that having a good reputation 
for high corporate governance and minority shareholder protection correlates with increased 
size, performance and liquidity of a securities market. In turn, the state of the market, its size 
and liquidity, also contribute to the expansion of the market for IPO.  
4. Pricing anomalies of Euro.NMs IPOs 
This section (sub-section 4.1) starts with a general description of the characteristics of IPOs 
listed  on  the  Euro.NMs.  It  then  investigates  the  traditional  pricing  anomalies:  short-run 
underpricing  (sub-section  4.2)  and  long-run  underperformance  (sub-section  4.3)  of  the 
companies  floated on the Euro.NMs.  We  explore the various theoretical explanations for 
short-run underpricing and long-run underperformance which rely upon issue method and the 
institutional  environment. Still,  our analysis shows that none of these analyses provide a 
sufficient  explanation.  We  argue  that  a  framework  that  focuses  on  determinants  such  as 
                                                 
6 Neuer Markt firms must issue a quarterly report within two months after each quarter, disclose annual financial 
statements within three months after the end of the business year according to IAS or US GAAP. Issuers listed 
on the Nouveau Marché are required to publish quarterly reports (and semi-annual accounts) and an audited 
annual  financial  statement,  according  to  IAS  or  US  GAAP,  where  a  reconciliation  table  is  provided.  Both 
markets also require that firms provide investors with information about share transactions by managers, the 
company, and the directors. Issuers are also asked to disclose management reports, summons for annual general 
meetings, the announcement of distributions and payment of dividends and the issuing of new shares as well as 
the exercise of conversion, subscription, and rights. Finally, issuing companies must also honour the Take-over 




industry characteristics, age and size of the firm and behavioural accounts serve to predict 
both initial and long-run underpricing of IPOs on the Euro.NMs. 
 
4.1 Sample description, data sources and Euro.NM IPO characteristics  
In this study, we include the whole population of the IPOs from all five Euro.NMs starting 
from the first date of trading until the end of 2000. Firm-specific information, such as the 
firms’ names, the date of the initial trading, the offer price and other listing particulars were 
obtained directly from the Euro.NMs exchanges. For the German market we completed the 
data using the annual volumes of the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer and data from Deutsche Bank 
AG.  The  first-day  share  prices,  weekly  share  prices  as  well  as  information  on  industrial 
sectors were obtained from Datastream. Information on the age of the firms was collected 
from the IPO prospectuses and Hoppenstedt for Germany. 
Table 3 reveals that the IPOs on the Euro.NMs are significantly younger than IPOs on the 
first and second-tier markets. For example, the average IPO on the Neuer Markt is less than 8 
years old whereas the average age of German IPOs on the Official and Regulated Markets 
amounts to more than 49 years (Goergen and Renneboog 2003). Across all the New Markets, 
those floated on the Brussels market are the oldest with an average age of 13 years. The 
average  size  varies  substantially  across  markets:  the  market  capitalization  of  the  average 
(median) French firm is 4.6 (2.5) times smaller than the average (median) German IPO.  
Book-building was used as the pricing method for all the IPOs, except for about 78 per cent of 
the Dutch IPOs which used the fixed price method. The book-building ratio in table 3 is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book-building low to 
the difference between the book-building high and the book-building low. The book-building 
ratio ranges from 0 to 1 if the price was set within the book-building range. A ratio of 0 means 
that the offer price was set to the lower bound of the book-building range and a ratio of 1 
means that it was set equal to the upper bound. In a few cases, the initial book-building range 
was different from the final book-building range, and as a result the offer price was outside 
the initial range. For these cases, the ratio will either be negative (if the final range was lower) 
or higher than 1 (if the final range was higher).
7 The median ratio for each market was exactly 
                                                 
7 We found the following negative (higher than one) book-building ratios: 2 (3) IPOs on the Nouveau Marché, 1 
(11) IPOs on the Neuer Markt, 0 (2) IPOs on the Nuovo Mercato and 0 (0) IPOs on the Amsterdam market. 




1, except for the Italian market which had a median ratio equal to its mean of 0.5. The fact 
that for most IPOs the offer price was set at the top end of the book-building range may 
reflect  the  overoptimism  of  investors in the new economy IPOs. Aussenegg,  Pichler and 
Stomper (2002) analyse IPOs on the Nasdaq and the Neuer Markt. They find that contrary to 
underwriters on the Nasdaq, underwriters on the Neuer Markt do not set the offer price above 
the price range and do therefore not use the information collected during the book-building 
process.
8 
[insert table 3 about here] 
The industry distribution of the Euro.NMs IPOs is reported in table 4. Except for the small 
Brussels market, most of the IPOs are in the new economy sectors of telecommunications, 
internet  and  software,  and  other  high-tech  sectors  such  as  electronic  equipment,  or 
pharmaceutical and medical appliances. In the French and German markets, more than 90 per 
cent of the listed firms can be classified as high-tech and almost a third of the IPOs are 
software firms. In contrast, the majority of German IPOs on the Main and Regulated Markets 
during  the  1980s  came  from  relatively  mature  industries  such  as  electricals,  mechanical 
engineering, packaging and paper, and motor components (Goergen 1998).  
[insert table 4 about here] 
 
4.2 Short-run underpricing of Euro.NMs IPOs 
One of the most widely documented pricing anomalies is short-run IPO underpricing, i.e. the 
phenomenon that the price at the end of the first trading day is substantially above the offer 
price. This observation, namely that firms fail to capture a substantial amount of external 
funds by setting too low an offer price, has been made in almost all markets worldwide for the 
1970s and 1980s (for an international overview, see Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 1994). 
This  phenomenon  continued  through  the  1990s  with  Rajan  and  Servaes  (1997),  amongst 
others, providing evidence that average initial returns of up to 16 per cent were a regular 
feature of the US new issue market. One of the main reasons why the average degree of 
underpricing varies across countries is the existence of different pricing methods. For the 
                                                 
8 In contrast, we find about 11 cases where the offer price is outside the initial price range. This difference in 
results may be due to the fact that Aussenegg et al. (2002) base themselves on the final book-building range 




French firms that went public in 1992-98, underpricing averaged 13 per cent (Derrien and 
Womack 1999) whereas for German IPOs introduced over the period of 1970-93 this number 
amounted to 9 per cent (Ljungqvist 1994). Dutch IPOs floated in 1985-98 were underpriced 
by 17 per cent (Van Frederikslust and Van der Geest 2001) whereas Rogiers et al. (1993) 
reported underpricing by about 10 per cent for a sample of 28 IPOs on the Brussels stock 
exchange. Cherubini and Ratti (1992) reported that the 75 Italian IPOs introduced over the 
period 1985-91 were underpriced by a formidable 27 per cent.   
A small number of mostly unpublished papers have looked at the short-run performance of 
IPOs on the Euro.NMs. Manigart and De Maeseneire (2000) analysed all the IPOs floated on 
Euro.NMs and Easdaq (now Nasdaq Europe) prior to the end of 1999 and found that the 
average initial underpricing was 36 per cent. Another study limited to internet IPOs on the 
Euro.NMs found that the underpricing was about 70-85 per cent for the German and French 
IPOs (Arosio, Giudici and  Paleari 2000). The Nuovo Mercato IPOs were underpriced by 
about 24 per cent on their first day of trading (Arosio, Bertoni and Giudici 2001). Aussenegg, 
Pichler and Stomper (2002) tested the informational role of book-building as advanced by the 
model by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) on a sample of internet, software, and computer IPOs 
floated between January 1999 and December 2000 on Nasdaq and the Neuer Markt. They 
found evidence of rents being earned by those investors providing information during the 
book-building process on Nasdaq, whereas no such rents were earned on the Neuer Markt. 
Table 5 reports the degree of underpricing for the 5 markets. Underpricing is calculated as the 
difference between the share price at the end of the first day (first week) of trading and the 
offer price divided by the offer price. At first sight, the numbers in panel A seem puzzling, as 
average underpricing measured on the first day ranges from a low 4 per cent in France to a 
staggering 86 per cent in the Netherlands. The range narrows down to between 5 and 65 per 
cent, if one measures underpricing at the end of the first week of listing. When IPOs on the 
Brussels market, which has attracted older firms and firms from more mature industries, are 
excluded, first-week underpricing is within the range of 25 to 65 per cent. This suggests that a 
higher degree of underpricing (in comparison to the main markets) is typical for high-tech 
firms  for  which  value  uncertainty  and  asymmetric  information between management and 
external investors are high. 




The higher first-day (first-week) average underpricing of 31.2 per cent (44.2 per cent) as 
compared to the first-tier continental European markets is entirely due to the Neuer Markt and 
NMAX,  as  levels  of  underpricing  on  the  Nouveau  Marché  and  the  Italian  and  Belgian 
Euro.NMs are similar to those reported for the main markets. Panel B of table 5 reports that, 
from  the  perspective  of  the  median  firm,  there  is  hardly  any  first-day  underpricing  in 
Belgium, France and Italy, with modest underpricing for the Neuer Markt. However, median 
first-week underpricing is significant apart from for Belgium and Italy.  
The distributions of first-day and first-week initial returns of the (high-tech) Euro.NMs firms 
(see the histograms for the French and German markets in figures 1 to 4) differ substantially 
from those of the main markets and differ across the Euro.NMs exchanges. The distribution 
for the Nouveau Marché shows that a large proportion of IPOs, namely about 60 per cent, are 
over- rather than underpriced. The proportion of IPOs with negative initial returns is about 40 
and 60 per cent at the end of the first day for the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché, 
respectively, and about 25 and 35 per cent at the end of the first week. This is very different 
from what studies on the main markets have found. For example, Ritter (1997) reports that for 
the US only one out of eleven IPOs had negative first-day initial returns.  
[insert figures 1-4 about here] 
Why is underpricing of German and Dutch Euro.NM high-tech firms 4 to 5 times larger than 
that of firms on their main markets and why are there large differences across the Euro.NMs? 
We need to ask whether differences in listing and disclosure rules between the main markets 
and between the Euro.NMs can account for the differences in the initial performance. As 
hypothesized  in  section  1,  stronger  disclosure  rules  on  the  Euro.NMs  than  on  the  main 
markets and the resulting reduction in asymmetric information are expected to lead to less 
underpricing on the Euro.NMs. We have documented that this is not the case. Thus it seems 
that the listing requirements, which are more lenient for the new markets than for the main 
markets, can be responsible for a more cautious setting of the offer price resulting in higher 
underpricing on the Euro.NMs. Still, listing rules cannot explain the differences in short-run 
underpricing across the Euro.NMs. First, since the listing rules for both markets are virtually 
identical,  they  cannot  account,  to  any  significant  extent,  for  the  wide  divergence  in 
performance between the Euro.NMs. Second, we are skeptical that other legal/institutional 
explanations, such as differences in rules concerning litigation risk and the probability of 




Marché or Neuer Markt. Unlike the United States, the legal liability of underwriters is not 
economically significant in continental Europe (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). 
Apart from listing rules – largely equivalent to IPO characteristics like age, size, trading and 
profit  history  –  differences  in  industry  distribution  also  explain  differences  in  initial 
underpricing between Euro.NMs and the main markets, on the one hand, and between the 
Euro.NMs,  on  the  other  hand.  Table  6  documents  that  the degree  of underpricing  varies 
substantially across industries. For  example,  information technology and cyclical services 
were  significantly  underpriced  by  34.5  per  cent  and  40.5  per  cent,  respectively, whereas 
underpricing  in  the  non-cyclical  service  industry  and  cyclical consumer goods were only 
14.22  per  cent  and  11.7  per  cent  (not  significantly  different  from  zero).  Underpricing  is 
exceptionally high  for the  Dutch new  market (NMAX) compared to the other Euro.NMs 
(table 5). This difference can be partially explained by the different flotation method. Whereas 
all the other Euro.NMs use the book-building method, the Dutch uses mainly the fixed-price 
method. As the fixed-price method does not allow the firm (and its underwriter) to collect 
more  information  about  how  potential  investors  value  its  shares,  more  substantial 
underpricing can be expected in the Dutch new market.  
 [insert table 6 about here] 
 
4.3 Long-run Performance of Euro.NMs’ IPOs 
To-date, there is no study investigating the long-run performance of IPOs on the Euro.NMs. 
The many papers investigating long-run returns for the main markets in Europe report usually 
significantly negative market-adjusted returns (for a review see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
2001). Van de Hoeijen and Van der Sar (1999) find that IPOs on the Amsterdam Exchanges 
underperform the market benchmark over the five years after their listing by 17.9 per cent. 
For  Germany, Ljungqvist  (1997) reports  that over  the  three years after  their listing IPOs 
underperform the market by about 12 per cent. A sample of IPOs introduced on the French 
market during 1996-98 generates three-year returns of 10 per cent below the market (Chahine 
2001). For the US, the picture is similar: Ritter (1991), Rajan and Servaes (1997), Carter et al. 
(1998), among others, have all shown that US IPOs underperform the market benchmarks by 




We  calculate  long-run  returns  for  periods  of  between  1  and  5  years  using  data  from 
Datastream. To avoid the impact of the initial underpricing and that of price support by the 
underwriter, the first 4 weeks of trading were excluded. We opted for weekly returns rather 
than the traditionally used monthly returns as some of the Euro.NM IPOs have less than 3 
years of share prices. We use two different methodologies and two different benchmarks as a 
robustness  check  on  our  results.  First,  we  use  the  market-adjusted  cumulative  abnormal 














CAR                
where  t m t i t i R R AR , , , - = is the abnormal return for firm i in month t and N is the number of 
firms in the sample. Ri,t stands for the actual return of firm i and Rm,t is the market return. To 
assess  the  statistical  significance  of  the  CARs,  we  use  t-statistics  based  on  Brown  and 
Warner’s (1980) Crude Dependence Adjustment Test in order to correct for cross-sectional 
dependence:  






























stat t  
where  CARt  is  the  cumulative  abnormal  return  until  month  t,  CAR152  is  the  cumulative 
abnormal return for the 152 weeks after the IPO and  t AR  is the average abnormal return in 
month t.  
Second, we use Buy-and-Hold returns (BHRs) as in Ritter (1991). For the case of the three-
year period (152 weeks), holding returns are computed as: 
( ) 1 1
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t i i R BHR  
where  t i R , is the raw return on firm i over the event week t. This measures the total return 
from a buy-and-hold strategy where the IPO is purchased four weeks after the listing and is 
held until the earlier of either its third-year listing anniversary or its date of delisting. We also 
adjust the BHR for market movements. For both the CARs and BHRs, we face the problem of 




Eurotop 300 and FTSE Euromid indices. According to FTSE, the Eurotop 300 is a widely 
accepted  European  benchmark,  which  measures  the  performance  of  Europe’s largest 300 
companies  in  terms  of  market  capitalization.  The  Euromid  represents  the  medium-
capitalization companies across Europe and consists of all the companies in the FTSE World 
Europe index minus the FTSE Eurotop 300 companies.  
For each of the firms introduced on the Euro.NMs from the first year of the exchange until 
2000, we calculate market-adjusted returns as well as buy-and-hold returns, measured over 
the  period  starting  one  month  after  the  IPO  and  covering  periods  of  1  to  5  years  (if 
applicable). Panel A of table 7 shows the performance of firms listed on the Nouveau Marché: 
there is statistically significant underperformance by more than 20 per cent in the first two 
years. Although, longer-term returns are also negative, they are not statistically significant 
from zero. The BHRs are substantially negative and even reach –50 per cent over a five-year 
period. It should be noted that these results include the effect of the bursting high-tech and 
dot-com bubble of March 2000. On the right-hand side of panel A, we largely exclude the 
consequences of the bursting of the dot-com bubble by investigating the performance over 1 
year and 2 years for the IPOs introduced during the period 1996-99. As a result, entirely 
different results are obtained: in the first year, the market-adjusted returns are between 18 and 
31 per cent, depending on the benchmark. Over the first two years after the IPO, the results 
are  significantly  positive  or  insignificantly  different  from  zero,  depending  on  the  market 
benchmark.
9   
A similar picture can be sketched for the Neuer Markt where the underperformance after the 
IPO  is  even  worse:  the  share  prices  of  firms  introduced  during  1997-2000  experienced 
market-adjusted price decreases of between 40 per cent (BHRs) and 60 per cent (CARs) over 
a two-year period (panel B of table 7). For a smaller subsample for which we can calculate 
returns over three and four years, we find that the negative price correction amounts to around 
64 per cent (BHRs) and 173 per cent (CARs). Excluding the market crash from the year 2000 
(right-hand side of panel B), we find strongly positive one-year returns, which substantially 
decline  over  a  two-year  period  when  the effect of  the  bursting dot-com  bubble becomes 
                                                 
9 The data presented in panel A exclude 10 outliers with returns of over 200% (excluding initial underpricing): 
Soitec, A Novo, Valtec, Egide, Wavecom, FI System, IT Link, Kalisto, Coheris, Metrologic. The inclusion of 
these firms gives a significantly positive return of 33% for year 1 and 51% for the three-year period. For panel B, 
we excluded the following outlier firms which had abnormal returns of more than 200%: EMTV & M NMBL, 
Mobilcom,  Morphosys,  Dlogistics,  Advanced  Optics  Network,  MWG-Biotech,  Parsytec,  Teleplan,  and  CE 




apparent for part of the sample (the IPOs introduced in 1999). The situation on the Brussels, 
Amsterdam and Milan Euro.NMs (panels C-E) is similar.
10  
The  table  in  the  appendix  shows  long-run  underpricing  by  industry:  the  negative  price 
correction  in  years  3  to  5  is  larger  in  those  industries  characterised  by  high  initial 
underpricing.  
The  evidence  presented  in  section  4.1  (that  IPO  volume  and  initial  returns  are  highly 
correlated (as in Lowry and Schwert 2002)), and in this section (that a severely negative 
performance correction takes place 3-5 years subsequent to the IPO) is consistent with the 
existence of a speculative bubble.  
[insert table 7 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
In 1996/97, the European New Markets were launched in order to facilitate the financing of 
innovative companies with a high-growth potential. These were the type of companies that 
continental European listing rules would have excluded earlier. Consequently, the Euro.NMs 
established admissions, listings and disclosure regulation, trading procedures and operational 
standards as a means to achieve an efficient decentralized market which reduced the barriers 
to flotation for small and medium-sized companies and provided start-up ventures with the 
best possible access to risk capital. We find that Euro.NM IPOs are substantially younger than 
IPOs on the main markets. Except for the Belgian market, Euro.NM IPOs also come from 
different industries, mainly high-tech industries.  
The  initial  returns  we  documented  in  this  chapter  are  remarkable  in  four  ways.  First, 
underpricing is on average 2-3 times higher than that on the main markets. It should be noted 
that the Euro.NMs were created during a surging IPO-wave and about two years before the 
bursting of the dot.com bubble. Second, the distribution of the initial returns is very different 
from that of IPOs on the established markets. Especially, the proportion of IPOs with negative 
initial returns is much higher. Third, in the period starting one month after the IPO and ending 
                                                 
10 For each of the Amsterdam, Brussels and Milan markets, one outlier firm was removed. Prolion (NMAX) 
gave a return of around 800 per cent in its first year of trading (603 per cent in the first two years and 545 per 
cent in the first three years of listing). The impact of one firm was such that without removing it from the sample 
the first year-average returns were 33.53 per cent, but its removal brought the returns down to –29.33 per cent 
(significant). International Brachytherapy (Brussels Euro.NM) had a return of 461 per cent in its first year. Open 




three to five years after the flotation, the buy-and-hold returns and the cumulative abnormal 
returns of firms introduced on the European New Markets are strongly negative and even 
substantially more negative than long-term returns on the main markets. Fourth, even across 
Euro.NMs, we find large differences in short- and long-run performance. Underpricing ranges 
from  only  4  per  cent  on  the  Nouveau  Marché  to  86  per  cent  in  the  Netherlands.  The 
differences in underpricing also induce differences in the long-term price corrections.  
It is puzzling that underpricing and long-term performance between the Euro.NMs are so 
different. What we can largely rule out are differences in regulation: those differences are 
only minor and cannot account for the major discrepancies in performance across markets. 
Furthermore, the flotation method cannot explain differences either as most firms introduced 
on the Euro.NMs (with exception of NMAX) used the book-building method. We have shown 
that  the  performance  discrepancies  can  largely  be  explained  by  differences  in  firm  and 
industry characteristics. Small deviations in industry distribution (especially in terms of the 
weight  of  internet  and  telecoms  firms)  can  already  account  for  significant  performance 
differences between the Euro.NMs. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) show for a sample of US 
IPOs that more fragmented ownership, lower pre-IPO insider ownership stakes, lower equity 
stakes held by venture capitalists and investment banks, and directed share programmes can 
already explain some changes in performance across time. Furthermore, the agency conflicts 
between  issuers  and  investment  banks  may  also  account  for  the  differences  in  IPO 
performance over time and across markets. Loughran and Ritter (2001) and Biais et al. (2000) 
conjecture that issuers grew complacent as valuations spiralled.  
Finally, the larger underpricing and stronger market correction in the Euro.NMs compared to 
the main markets suggests that a higher degree of uncertainty (resulting from more lenient 
listing rules in the Euro.NMs) and investor irrationality were present in the new markets.  
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Table 1: Number of IPOs on the Euro.NMs  
This table includes the number of recently introduced IPOs on the Euro.NMs. The numbers exclude (i) 
transfers from the OTC, (ii) firms already listed on Easdaq, (iii) introductions, (iv) rights issues, (v) and 
firms with missing share prices.  










1996  –  14  –  –  – 
1997  1  17  11  –  3 
1998  6  39  41  –  8 
1999  6  30  130  6  1 
2000  3  50  143  21  2 
Total  16  150  325  27  14 
Source: List adapted from the data provided by the Euro.NMs as well as Hoppenstedt and Deutsche 
Bank AG for Germany 
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Table 2: Listing and disclosure requirements and regulation on the Euro.NMs, Nasdaq Europe, AIM and techMark. 
  Neuer Markt  Nouveau Marché  NMAX 
(Amsterdam) 
Euro.NM Brussels  Nuovo Mercato  Nasdaq Europe 
(formerly, 
Easdaq) 
AIM  TechMark 
Accounting 
Standards  
US GAAP or IAS  French  GAAP  and 
IAS  (regarding 
consolidation rules) 
US  GAAP 
conversion 
permitted  
US  GAAP  or 
IAS 
US GAAP or IAS  Italian GAAP or 
IAS  
US GAAP or IAS  UK  GAAP,  US 
GAAP or IAS 
UK GAAP, US 




Quarterly  Turnover  quarterly 
and  accounts  bi-
annually 
Quarterly  Quarterly  Quarterly  Quarterly  Bi-annually  Quarterly 
Lock-in Period  6 months  80%  of  shares  for 
12 months or 100% 
for 6 months 
80%  of  shares 
for 12 months 
80%  of  shares  for 
12 months or 100% 
for 6 months 
80%  of  shares 
for  period of 12 
months 
80% of shares for 
12  months  or 
100%  for  6 
months 




¼PPLQLPXP  ¼PPLQLPXP  No  minimum 
requirement 
¼PPLQLPXP  No  minimum 
requirement 
¼  P
depending  on 
route  to 
admission  






¼PPLQLPXP  ¼PPLQLPXP  ¼PPLQLPXP  ¼PPLQLPXP  ¼PPLQLPXP  Minimum of  ¼ 
m  depending  on 
route  to 
admission 
No  minimum 
requirement 




Minimum  of  3 
years  financial 
statements,  some 
exceptions allowed 
No minimum but 3 
years  of  financial 
statements 
preferred 
Minimum  of  3 
years of financial 
statements 
Minimum  of  3 
years  of  financial 
statements 
Minimum 1 year 
trading,  some 
exceptions 
allowed 
0-2  years 
depending  on 
route  to 
admission 
No  minimum 
requirement 
Minimum  of  3 
years  financial 




Past Profitability  No  minimum 
requirement 
No  minimum 
requirement 
No  minimum 
requirement 
No  minimum 
requirement 
No  minimum 
requirement 
¼-1m depending 
on  route  to 
admission 
No  minimum 
requirement 




Articles  of 
association  must 
conform to rules of 
issuer’s  home 
jurisdiction 
No change  No change  No change  Admission 
dependent  on 
positive  ruling 
from  Borsa; 
audited financial 
statements  must 
be submitted for 
equivalence 
declaration 




German  and 
English 
French  Dutch  and  
English   
 
French  and  Dutch 
or English 
Italian  English  English  English 
Interview  with 
Exchange 
No  No  No   No  Yes  Only  in  listing 
appeal 
No  Yes 




Table 3: Characteristics of Euro.NMs’ IPOs 
This  table  shows some  characteristics of companies listed on the Euro.NMs. Age is calculated as the number of full years 
between the year of foundation and the year of the flotation.The book-building ratio is calculated as the ratio of the difference 
between the offer price and the book-building low to the difference between the book-building high and the book-building low. 
Market capitalization is the market capitalization of the firm at the end of the first day of trading. For Germany, data were not 
available for most of the foreign firms listed on the Neuer Markt. The number of firms for which information of a characteristic 
is available is given in parentheses. 















capitalization on first 









NA  306.7 
(464) 
Median market 
capitalization on first 









NA  102.7 
(464) 
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Table 4: Industries with the highest frequency of Euro.NMs’ IPOs – The top-10 rankings. 
This table shows the percentage of Euro.NMs’ firms of our sample by industry. Number of firms is shown between brackets. Source: DataStream 
Belgium  France  Germany  Italy  The Netherlands 
Banks  19% (3)  Software  29% (43)  Software  29% (90)  Other Business  26% (7)  Software  29% (4) 
Electrical Equipment  13% (2)  Computer Services  12% (17)  Internet  12% (36)  Internet  19% (5)  Computer Services  29% (4) 
Steel  13% (2)  Telecom Fixed Line  9%  (13)  Electronic Equipment  11% (33)  Computer Services  11% (3)  Business Support  14% (2) 
Broadcasting  13% (2)  Electronic Equipment  8%  (12)  Business Support  7% (21)  Software  7% (2)  Electrical Equipment  7% (1) 
Retailers E-Commerce  13% (2)  Media Agencies  3% (5)  Computer Services  6% (20)  Broadcasting  7% (2)  Household Appliances + 
Housewares 
7% (1) 
Eng. Contractors  6% (1)  Pharmaceuticals  3% (4)  Broadcasting  5% (17)  Telecom Fixed Line  7% (2)  Household Products  7% (1) 
Household Products  6% (1)  Computer hardware  2% (3)  Media Agencies  4% (13)  Chemicals, Speciality  4% (1)  Medical Equipment + Supplies  7% (1) 
Clothing + Footwear  6% (1)  Other Distributors  2% (3)  Other Health Care  3%   (9)  Distrib. Ind. Comps.  4% (1)     
Textiles + Leather 
Goods 
6% (1)  Retail, Hardlines  2% (3)  Telecom Fixed Line  3%   (9)  Electronic Equipment  4% (1)     
Other Financial  6% (1)  Other financial  2% (3)  Auto Parts  2%   (5)  Publishing + Printing  4% (1)     
        Chemicals, Speciality  2%   (5)  Business Support  4% (1)     




Table 5: Initial returns of firms floated on the Euro.NMs (1996-2000). 
 
This table presents the average and median first-day and first-week returns of firms floated on the Euro.NM. The first-day 
return is calculated as the ratio of the trading price at the end of the first day of trading (or the first trading price available) 
over the offer price minus 1.First-week underpricing is calculated as the ratio of the trading price at the end of the first 
week of trading (or the closest day to this) over the offer price minus 1. 




Panel A: Average first-day returns 
First-day return (%)  10.36  4.19  43.32  18.84  86.07  31.17 
First-week return (%)  5.38  25.10  54.27  36.88  64.47  44.18 
Sample size  13  144  319  26  11  513 
Panel B: Median first-day returns 
First-day return (%)  2.18  0.00  8.00  0.00  90.07  0.19 




Table 6: Initial returns of firms floated on the Euro.NMs by industry (1996-2000). 
This table presents the average and median first-day and first-week returns of firms floated on the Euro.NM, by 
industry. The first-day return is calculated as the ratio of the trading price at the end of the first day of trading (or 
the first trading price available) over the offer price minus 1.First-week underpricing is calculated as the ratio of 
the trading price at the end of the first week of trading (or the closest day to this) over the offer price minus 1. 
***,**,* stand for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.   
Industry  Average (%)  Median (%)  t-statistic 
(average  
Sample size 
Panel A: First-day returns 
Basic Industries  26.11
***  25.76  2.563  10 
General Industrials  27.65
***  2.96  3.350  60 
Cyclical Consumer Goods  11.68  0.00  1.521  11 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods  23.29
***  0.00  2.729  33 
Cyclical Services  40.46
***  1.09  5.500  102 
Non-Cyclical Services  14.22
***  0.00  2.469  29 
Utilities  0.00  0.00  –  2 
Financials  19.40
*  0.00  1.821  14 
Information Technology  34.50
***  0.13  7.939  239 
Panel B: First-week returns 
Basic Industries  36.45
***  39.38  5.215  10 
General Industrials  42.27
***  18.29  4.739  60 
Cyclical Consumer Goods  56.92
**  3.18  1.974  11 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods  40.28
***  14.77  3.471  33 
Cyclical Services  52.30
***  12.97  5.519  102 
Non-Cyclical Services  35.61
***  17.46  4.135  29 
Utilities  15.70
***  15.70  10.547  2 
Financials  23.65
*  5.38  1.652  14 
Information Technology  45.28
***  23.91  9.394  239 
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Table 7: Long-run returns for Euro.NMs’ IPOs (1996-2000). 
This table presents the long term performance of firms floated on the Euro.NM for 1 to 5 years after the flotation each 
of the 5 Euro.NM markets. CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return adjusted for one of two indices: the FTSE 
Eurotop  300  or  the  FTSE  Euromid  indices.  The  Eurotop  300  is  a  widely  accepted  European  benchmark,  which 
measures the performance of Europe’s largest 300 companies in terms of market capitalization. The Euromid represents 
the medium capitalization companies across Europe and consists of all the companies in FTSE World Europe index 
minus the FTSE Eurotop 300 companies. BHR stands for buy and hold returns. Both the CAR and BHR are calculated 
for several years starting one month subsequent to the flotation. In parentheses, Brown and Warner t-statistics are given 
for the cumulative abnormal returns and the skewness-adjusted t-statistics are given for the BHR. ***,**,* stand for 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.   
 
 
Panel A: Nouveau Marché   
 
  IPOs introduced during 1996-2000  IPOs introduced during 
1996-99 
  No. of years after the IPO  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  1 year  2 years 















































































Panel B: Neuer Markt   
 
  IPOs introduced during 1997-2000  IPOs introduced during 
1997-99 
  No. of years after the IPO  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  1 year  2 years 














































































Panel C: NMAX (Euro.NM Amsterdam) 
 
  IPOs introduced during 1997-2000  IPOs introduced during 
1997-99 
  No. of years after the IPO  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  1 year  2 years 









































































Panel D: Euro.NM Brussels 
 
  IPOs introduced during 1997-2000  IPOs introduced during 
1997-99 
  No. of years after the IPO  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  1 year  2 years 

























































Panel E: Nuovo Mercato   
 
  IPOs introduced during 1999-2000  IPOs introduced during 
1999 
  No. of years after the IPO  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  1 year  2 years 



















































Industrial analysis of long-run performance of Euro.NMs’ IPOs (1996 –2000) 
This  table  shows  the  long-run  performance  over  one  to  five  years  for  all  companies  floated  on  the  Euro.NMs  by 
industry. CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return adjusted for one of two indices: the FTSE Eurotop 300 or the 
FTSE Euromid indices. The Eurotop 300 is a widely accepted European benchmark, which measures the performance 
of Europe’s largest 300 companies in terms of market capitalization. The Euromid represents the medium capitalization 
companies across Europe and consists of all the companies in FTSE World Europe index minus the FTSE Eurotop 300 
companies. BHR stands for buy and hold returns. Both the CAR and BHR are calculated for several years starting one 
month subsequent to the flotation. In parentheses, Brown and Warner t-statistics are given for the cumulative abnormal 
returns and the skewness-adjusted t-statistics are given for the BHR. ***,**,* stand for statistical significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level.   
 
Panel A: Basic Industries (code 10) 
  No. of years after the IPO 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   -28.51 (-1.00)  -51.76 (-1.40)  -53.75 (-1.03)  -48.49 (-0.49)  16.19 (0.14) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -28.02 (-1.02)  -23.21 (-0.58)  -21.23 (-0.37)  -15.74 (-0.16)  41.52 (0.34) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -11.56 (-0.44)  -36.25
*** (-2.34)  -51.30
*** (-4.40)  -63.40
*** (-4.07)  -60.42
*** (-4.34) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -8.75 (-0.28)  -30.05
* (-1.74)  -46.37
*** (-473)  -56.20
*** (-4.82)  -57.46
*** (-6.65) 
 
Panel B: General Industries (code 20) 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   3.68 (0.31)  -15.35 (-0.89)  -51.21
*** (-2.41)  -76.05
*** (-2.45)  -169.44
*** (-2.76) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  6.36 (0.52)  -14.40 (-0.82)  -55.72
*** (-2.56)  -84.98
*** (-2.67)  -184.84
*** (-2.96) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  16.16 (1.09)  -12.53 (-0.88)  -38.46
*** (-3.11)  -40.00
*** (-3.66)  -44.99
*** (-2.51) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  19.49 (1.24)  -10.60 (-0.68)  -38.33
*** (-3.06)  -40.99
*** (-3.28)  -47.21
*** (-4.70) 
 
Panel C: Cyclical Consumer Goods (code 30) 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -57.94
*** (-2.63)  -39.83 (-1.06)  -47.50 (-1.13)  -65.69 (-1.23)  -68.97 (-0.80) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -56.92
*** (-2.62)  -32.55 (-0.87)  -47.43 (-1.14)  -66.47 (-1.28)  -83.08 (-0.99) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -40.92
*** (-3.01)  -59.08
*** (-10.79)  -64.97
*** (-8.02)  -65.42
*** (-5.04)  -64.14
*** (-5.81) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -38.56
*** (-2.68)  -50.74
*** (-5.60)  -60.93
*** (-9.92)  -59.82
*** (-9.04)  -62.09
*** (-8.39) 
 
Panel D: Non-cyclical Consumer Goods (code 40) 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)  4.83 (0.30)  4.47 (0.19)  -2.59 (-0.08)  42.20 (0.85)  14.89 (0.21) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  6.13 (0.39)  4.07 (0.18)  -10.03 (-0.31)  34.55 (0.69)  -2.51 (-0.04) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  24.98 (1.16)  -10.31 (-0.67)  -28.26
*** (-2.10)  -26.69
*** (-2.07)  -27.69
*** (-2.07) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  27.08 (1.19)  -8.68 (-0.46)  -29.32
*** (-2.25)  -26.94
*** (-2.09)  -29.89





Panel E: Cyclical Services (code 50) 
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -0.99 (-0.10)  -50.70
*** (-3.22)  -63.94
*** (-2.46)  -60.56
* (-1.85)  -63.03 (-1.48) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -1.05 (-0.10)  -52.45
*** (-3.25)  -70.51
*** (-2.68)  -70.85
*** (-2.13)  -83.31
** (-1.96) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -4.71 (-0.49)  -28.75
*** (-2.44)  -50.94
*** (-5.65)  -54.34
*** (-6.35)  -54.00
*** (-6.31) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -1.96 (-0.20)  -28.96
*** (-2.47)  -52.84
*** (-6.07)  -56.30
*** (-6.80)  -56.62
*** (-6.86) 
 
Panel F: Non-cyclical Services (code 60)  
  1 year  2 years  3 years  3.6 years   
 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -17.46 (-1.16)  -22.28 (-0.67)  -102.71
* (-1.81)  -59.46 (-0.55)   
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -22.62 (-1.46)  -28.91 (-0.86)  -119.19
*** (-2.09)  -78.78 (-0.72)   
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  32.43 (0.96)  -20.49 (-1.07)  -51.04
*** (-5.27)  -52.84
*** (-5.61)   
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  27.54 (0.79)  -25.35 (-1.27)  -59.78
*** (-6.07)  -61.12
*** (-6.50)   
 
Panel G: Utilities (code 70)  
  1 year  2 years       
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   27.06  35.76       
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  17.22  23.29       
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  5.27  0.23       
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -3.85  -9.54       
 
Panel H: Financials (code 80)  
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years   
 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   -20.67 (-0.85)  -30.17 (-0.76)  -120.23
* (-1.65)  -177.20
***  (-2.07)   
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -22.57 (-0.91)  -35.13 (-0.89)  -133.73
* (-1.83)  -195.96
*** (-2.27)   
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -10.60 (-0.43)  -46.21
*** (-5.19)  -55.55
*** (-8.16)  -56.93
*** (-8.01)   
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -12.25 (-0.46)  -51.17
*** (-4.82)  -62.61
*** (-9.31)  -64.89
*** (-8.98)   
 
Panel I : Information Technology (code 90)  
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   -27.29
*** (-3.21)  -64.51
*** (-5.01)  -100.07
*** (-4.80)  -153.23
*** (-5.14)  -155.28
*** (-3.19) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -30.21
*** (-3.58)  -70.84
*** (-5.49)  -111.91
*** (-5.35)  -172.48
*** (-5.73)  -181.05
*** (-3.73) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  -18.53
*** (-3.35)  -38.72
*** (-4.65)  -55.64
*** (-10.38)  -62.13
*** (-18.26)  -61.78
*** (-18.44) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  -20.48
*** (-3.50)  -42.92
*** (-9.87)  -61.62
*** (-11.19)  -68.81
*** (-20.71)  -68.79
*** (-20.71) 
 
Panel J : Other industries  
  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years 
CAR (FTEU 300 adj.)   -0.17 (0.00)  -46.38 (-1.18)  -47.03 (-0.67)  -10.91 (-0.12)  25.88 (0.22) 
CAR (FTE MIDI adj.)  12.99 (0.48)  -30.39 (-0.77)  -31.74 (-0.45)  2.04 (0.02)  30.90 (0.25) 
BHR (FTEU 300 adj.)  4.63 (0.14)  -50.74 (-1.05)  -52.05 (-0.67)  -42.55 (-0.47)  -103.43
***(-4.94) 
BHR (FTE MIDI adj.)  19.97 (0.52)  -29.41 (-0.58)  -27.96 (-0.33)  -18.27 (-0.18)  -8.24
*** (-3.92) 
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Figure 1: Histogram of first-day initial market-adjusted returns for the German Neuer Markt 
 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of first-week initial market-adjusted returns for the German Neuer 
Markt 
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Figure 4: Histogram of first-week initial market-adjusted returns for the French Nouveau 
Marché 
 
 
 